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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
REGULATING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
Rebecca Bratspies*
It's part of our cultural tradition-'If it can be done, do it. Let's
worry about the consequences later."
There is an old folk saying "to someone with a hammer, every problem
looks like a nail." Like many folk sayings, it captures an important facet of
human behavior-in this case, the limitations that available tools and ideas
place on perspectives and thinking. This is a theme that resonates powerfully
in the context of agricultural biotechnology. For those wanting to use or
exploit biotechnology, it seems screamingly obvious that this technology will
solve-in whole or in part-a host of problems, ranging from overuse of
pesticides to global hunger and malnutrition. The technology is the hammer
capable of pounding in all these many protruding nails in the collective
international structure-a solution in search of problems.
There is nothing inherently wrong with such an approach-that is how
many problems are ultimately solved. For those focused on solving any one
particular problem, however, the connection between biotechnology and
hunger, or biotechnology and reduced pesticide use, may not be so obvious.
Other solutions may more closely address either the perceived roots of the
problem or may offer a more attractive risk-reward profile.
Thus, one finds a scientist or an agribusiness company genuinely insisting
that its technology is the solution to a problem, and feeling like they are
pounding on closed doors. The persons tasked with solving these problems
may be focused on entirely different sets of solutions; they may also view the
proffered technological fix to be naked self-interest and self-promotion by its
advocate. Is this a marketing problem, an information asymmetry, or does it
point to a deeper misunderstanding of the role of the expert-particularly the
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research advice, Dean Michelle Anderson and my CUNY Law colleagues for their insightful
suggestions, and the organizers and participants of the 2007 Kansas Journal of Law and Public
Policy Symposium for discussions that helped shape this article. Finally, special thanks to Naomi
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1. Andrew Maykuth, Genetic Wonders to Come: Some See Boon, Others Catastrophe,
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scientific or technical expert-in making this kind of fundamental policy
decision?
Opponents of genetically modified (GM) technology are often accused of
being obstructionists-of creating impossible demands for certainty before
approving of these new technologies. The clear implication is that these
demands are wholly strategic: as this threshold of certainty cannot be reached,
opponents really intend to block deployment of the technology. This criticism
has often been used in attempts to discredit opponents of agricultural
biotechnology. There are certainly those voices within the broader debate.
However, biotechnology's advocates are often too quick to label any
questioning of their claims of safety and benefit as a reactionary blocking
strategy. By lumping those who want to question the process by which safety
and risk are assessed with those determined to perceive risk at all costs, any
questioning of the technology can easily be relegated to the Luddite margins.
There is a difference between a demand for certainty and a demand that
appropriate questions be explored. The former focuses on results-whether
the fruits of exploration point so conclusively to a particular outcome that no
other explanation is tenable. The latter addresses process-whether the
exploration has been structured in a fashion likely to uncover relevant
information. Both sets of demands can be obstructionist; the Tobacco
Institute's insistence that the link between cigarettes and cancer was "not
proven" is perhaps the best example of how a demand for certainty can be
wielded to prevent otherwise reasonable social actions. 2 Similarly, a common
tactic to delay or prevent social activity is to "send it back for more study."
However, to suggest that demands for more-or more appropriate-study are
always or even predominantly obstructionist is to caricature wholly legitimate
and important public participation in public decision making.
A healthy society needs room for genuine dialogue, particularly around
the process of evaluating and weighing risks to public safety. Many of the
most significant questions surrounding agricultural biotechnology raise
structural issues, in particular whether we have created an appropriate
framework within which to make decisions about safety and efficacy. This
article takes up that question and explores whether the United States regulatory
system for agricultural biotechnology identifies and explores fundamental
questions in a fashion reasonably likely to produce relevant answers.
To that end, this article explores the United States regulatory regime for
agricultural biotechnology. Part I gives a brief overview of the critical role
that trust plays in the regulation of biotechnology. Part II provides some
2. There are myriad tobacco related documents publicly available on the internet that chart
out a strategy of arguing that the link between tobacco and health effects was "not proven." One
repository of such documents is Tobacco Documents.Org, Tobacco Documents Online,
http://tobaccodocuments.org (last visited May 2, 2007). See Larry Breed, Strategies of the
Tobacco Industry, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/strategieslb.html (last visited May 2,
2007) (summarizing this strategy).
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background on the scientific innovations that led to the mass production of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for use in commercial agriculture.
This history is presented with an eye towards how it might either build or
threaten trust in the technology. Part III evaluates the development of the
United States regulatory regime, again through the lens of whether its history
and evolution are likely to promote public trust in agricultural biotechnology.
Part IV details some of the successes and failures of agricultural biotechnology
over the decade it has been in widespread use and explores the ramifications
those events might have for public acceptance of biotechnology. Part V makes
normative proposals intended to bolster the credibility of regulatory agencies
and reshape the regulatory dialogue in order to create public confidence that
their needs and concerns are being incorporated into the regulation of GMOs.
I. WHY TRUST MATTERS
When citizens do not have confidence in the regulatory systems that
purport to protect them, social trust breaks down. The lack of a transparent,
well-organized regulatory system threatens public trust in biotechnology and
more fundamentally in government itself. The success of agricultural
biotechnology depends upon society's willingness to accept and consume food
produced using this technology. This willingness hinges on the level of trust
that the technology is being developed and used in a safe manner. 3 Thus, the
adequacy of regulatory oversight and information gathering are central to the
future of the technology.
Social acceptance of biotechnology depends upon trust-trust that the
many individuals and groups involved in the development, production and
oversight of these crops are responsible, ethical and trustworthy.4
This needed trust is multilayered-the consumer must trust that the
scientists know what they are doing in developing these crops, that the
companies marketing and distributing the crops are operating in a legal and
ethical manner, that the regulators are exercising proper oversight, that the
farmers are obeying the regulations, and that the consumer is not being lied to
or misled.5 Because the development, production and marketing of GM crops
3. See L.J. Frewer et al., What Determines Trust in Information About Food-Related Risks?
Underlying Psychological Constructs, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 473 (1996).
4. See id.; see also L.J. Frewer et al., 'Objection' Mapping in Determining Group and
Individual Concerns Regarding Genetic Engineering, 14 AGRICULTURE AND HUMAN VALUES
67, 78 (1997) (identifying trust as a central explanatory variable); see Dr. Lynn J. Frewer, Dr.
Richard Shepherd, & Dr. Paul Sparks, The Interrelationship Between Perceived Knowledge,
Control and Risk Associated with a Range of Food-Related Hazards Targeted at the Individual,
Other People and Society, 14 J. FOOD SAFETY 19, 22 (1994) (emphasizing the central role that
trust plays in public attitudes toward food safety and technology).
5. For a theoretical explanation of the role that trust plays in the success of biotechnology,
see Harvey S. James, Public Trust and Support for Biotechnology: Lessons for Post-Market
Surveillance of GM Foods (2004) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=517342 (last visited May 2, 2007).
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requires the activities of so many different parties, there are multiple levels on
which this process can break down, creating suspicion and mistrust. The
presence or absence of trust dramatically affects communications about and
perceptions of risk.6
The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications reports that grower adoption of GM crops continues unabated.7
Yet, at the same time, the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology continues
to find fairly low levels of public confidence in agricultural biotechnology. 8
Although between 2001 and 2006 the number of respondents expressing
outright opposition to GM crops decreased from 58% to 46%, the percentage
of Americans supporting the technology remained constant (around 27%).9 It
is even more striking that, in 2006, after a decade of widespread plantings of
GM corn, cotton, soy, and canola, only 34% of respondents characterized GM
foods as "basically safe," while 29% characterized them as basically unsafe.' 0
After a decade of commercial exploitation of agricultural technology, public
trust in the technology is still "up for grabs."
Why do these levels of distrust exist? Consumers sense both a "reporting
bias" on the part of industry (an incentive to overstate benefits and understate
risks) and a "knowledge bias" in themselves (an inability to fully anticipate all
contingencies). Thus, as to their relationship with biotechnology purveyors,"
consumers feel systemically and strategically disadvantaged. This perception
profoundly affects public dialogue over the risks and benefits of agricultural
biotechnology. A transparent and thorough regulatory scheme can increase
public confidence in this technology.12
Attitudes toward a broad range of biotechnology applications are
powerfully influenced by the expected impact the technology will have on
individuals and their families.' 3 Not surprisingly, as perceived risks increase,
6. Id. (providing a brief literature review); cf Andrew J. Knight, Does Application Matter?
An Examination of Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnology Applications, 9 AG
BIOFORUM 121, 126 (2006) (suggesting that the influence of perceived benefits from
biotechnology outweighs trust as a statistically significant factor in attitudes toward
biotechnology).
7. See CLIVE JAMES, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS (ISAAA), GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2006
(2006), available at http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/35/executivesummary/
default.html (last visited May 2, 2007).
8. PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, PUBLIC SENTIMENT ABOUT
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD (2007), http://pewagbiotech.org/research/2006update/2.php. (last
visited May 2, 2007) (hereinafter "PEW INITIATIVE").
9. Id.
10. Id. (The respondents expressing discomfort or safety concerns increase markedly when
the conversation shifts from genetically modified (GM) plants to GM or cloned animals).
11. HARVEY S. JAMES, JR., THE EFFECT OF TRUST ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY: EVIDENCE FROM THE US BIOTECHNOLOGY STUDY 1997-98 (2003), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=380321 (last visited May 2, 2007).
12. PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 9.
13. Id.
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public acceptance decreases, while as the expected benefits increase, so does
public acceptance. 14  A similar relationship has been found between
uncertainty and public acceptance of agricultural biotechnology.
This relationship between risk, uncertainty, benefits and public
acceptance-although not surprising-underscores just how critical a credible
regulatory scheme is to the successful development of the technology. Indeed,
Professor James reports that a credible oversight scheme and trust in the
institutions promoting and overseeing agricultural biotechnology are the single
biggest predictors of public acceptance of this technology.' 5 Although the Pew
Initiative reports a less robust relationship between trust and acceptance, 50%
of the Pew respondents identified trust in information sources as the most
important factor in shaping their attitude towards biotechnology.' 6 Industry
analysts routinely denigrate this relationship between trust and acceptance,
characterizing it as the public, befuddled by technological complexity,"substituting trust for knowledge."' 7 Such a description ignores the critical
trust relationship at the heart of the regulatory state. Only when the public
believes it has reason to trust that regulators are acting in the public interest
will assessments of risks and benefits that underlie regulatory decisions be
credible.
The most important determinants of trust are a track record of good
decisions and an unbiased source.' 8  Unfortunately, neither the regulatory
institutions charged with overseeing agricultural biotechnology nor the
biotechnology industry itself has developed the kind of track record likely to
engender trust.19  Improving the trustworthiness and competence of the
regulatory agencies charged with overseeing agricultural biotechnology is
therefore critical, both to protect the public's safety and to create public
confidence that their interests are being protected. Proper regulation thus
addresses both reality and perception.
14. JAMES, supra note 11, at 9.
15. Id. at 13.
16. PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 9.
17. Jeffrey D. Wolt & Robert K. D. Peterson, Agricultural Biotechnology and Societal
Decision-Making: The Role of Risk Analysis, 3 AGBIOFORUM 39, 41 (2000).
18. Frewer et al., supra note 3, at 476.
19. In particular, recent failures at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seem to have
dramatically reduced its credibility overall. According to the PEW INITIATIVE, the FDA was the
most trusted institution for information on GM foods in 2001, with 41% of respondents
expressing trust in the agency. By 2006, after a series of high profile regulatory failures
involving FDA, trust in FDA had fallen to 29%. PEW INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 9; For
information on the regulatory issues that provoked this reduction in trust, see FDA Announces
Series of Changes to the Class of Marketed Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs),
available at http://www.fda.govIbbs/topics/news/2005/NEW0117l.html; Testimony of David J.
Graham Before the Senate Finance Committee Hearing, FDA, Merck and Vioxx Putting Patient
Safety First? available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/sitepages/hearing Ill 804.htm. The
message is clear: trust is ephemeral and can be lost. Regulatory failures in one context can erode
trust in a regulator across the board.
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II. HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES
Before exploring the history of agricultural biotechnology in the United
States, it is important to lay out some parameters for discussion. Proponents of
modem biotechnology like to characterize the development of biotechnology
as a linear progression extending back in time to the first makers of beer and
bread.20  While it is certainly possible to characterize yeast-mediated food
production as a form of biotechnology, 2 1 in the context of genetic engineering,
such a characterization smacks of reductio ad absurdum and thus does little to
advance open dialogue. Such a use of the term "biotechnology" is so
expansive as to be meaningless and has little relevance to the ongoing public
discourse over GMOs. This article will use the term biotechnology to mean"modem biotechnology," as defined in the Cartagena Protocol 22 to the
Convention on Biodiversity. 23
20 For fairly typical examples of this characterization from a range of sources including an
industry trade group, see BIO, Food Biotechnology, available at http://www.bio.org/speeches/
pubs/er/food.asp (offering the conventional position of the biotechnology industry); OECD,
RECOMBINANT DNA SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 12 (1986), available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/54/ 1943773.pdf; Donald Boulter, Plant Biotechnology: Facts and
Public Perception, 40 PHYTOCHEMSITRY 1 (1995).
21. On one level, this claim is absolutely accurate. If biotechnology is defined broadly
enough, its use in agriculture and manufacturing extends back for centuries, if not millennia. For
example, the processes used to make beer, cheese, yogurt and bread could all qualify as
biotechnology. The current public policy disputes do not refer to these conventional forms of
biotechnology but instead to modem biotechnology-new and controversial techniques which
involve the transfer of genes between species (genetic engineering/genetic modification) in a
manner and at a speed not previously possible.
22. Article 3 of the Cartagena Protocol defines modem biotechnology as:
(T)he application of: (a) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or
organelles, or (b) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural
physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used
in traditional breeding and selection.
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY ART.
3 (2000), 39 I.L.M. 1027. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) uses a slightly different definition, as does the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAO). See generally, http://www.oecd.org/home; http://www.fao.org.
The United States defines biotechnology as "the use of modem scientific techniques,
including genetic engineering, to improve or modify plants, animals, and microorganisms." U.S.
Department of State, Frequently Asked Questions About Biotechnology, http://usinfo.state.gov/
ei/economic issues/biotechnology/biotechfaq.html (last visited May 2, 2007). See generally
U.S. Department of State, Glossary of Biotechnology, http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/ites/0903/
ijee/glossary.htm (last visited May 2, 2007); United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
Agricultural Biotechnology: Glossary, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Biotechnology/
glossary.htm (last visited May 2, 2007).
All these definitions clearly focus on the techniques and technologies that create the
controversy this article explores.
23. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, available at
http://biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf. The CBD defines biotechnology to be "any technological
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivates thereof, to make or modify
products or processes for specific use." Id. at art. 2.
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A. A Brief Introduction to the Technology
4
Humans have spent millennia modifying food crops to suit their needs.
Today's crops little resemble, in taste or agronomic characteristics, their wild,
uncultivated relatives. Fairly early in human agronomic history, it became
clear that desirable traits could be maximized and undesirable traits minimized
if farmers selectively bred individual plants and animals. This selective
breeding process began largely as a matter of trial and error, with no reliable
means of predicting the outcome of any individual breeding attempt. At the
dawn of the 2 0th Century, a growing understanding of Mendelian genetics
25
facilitated and systematized selective breeding, producing a bumper crop (so to
speak) of hybrid crops developed to express particular traits. As farms
consolidated and a national or even global food market developed, selection
began to focus on traits deemed useful in a commodities market-delayed
ripening, thick skins, and other traits that enable foodstuffs to withstand long-
distance shipping. With the growth of giant food producers came an increased
demand for crops exhibiting traits that enhanced processing.
Over time, these commercial pressures have prompted breeders to
develop radically altered crops. In doing so, selective breeders labored under a
significant constraint-they could only enhance or suppress traits already
present in a species. 26 Modem genetic engineering freed breeders from the
limitations imposed by the existing characteristics of a species. In a process
called transformation, 7 genes can now be isolated and transferred to a food
24. See generally REBECCA M. BRATSPIES, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, BIOTECHNOLOGY PRIMER FOR LAWYERS 1 (2003) (offering a more detailed
explanation of the technology behind genetic engineering).
25. GREGOR MENDEL, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDIZATION (1865), available at
http://www.mendelweb.orgiMWpaptoc.html. Working with pea plants, the monk Gregor Mendel
conclusively demonstrated what are now fundamental laws of genetic inheritance. The so-called
Mendelian Laws of genetics describe the heritability and independent assortment of traits. See
COLD SPRINGS HARBOR LABORATORY, DNA FROM THE BEGINNING (2002), available at
http://www.dnaftb.org/dnaftb/ (last visited May 2, 2007); ROBIN MARANTz HENIG, THE MONK
IN THE GARDEN: THE LOST AND FOUND GENIUS OF GREGOR MENDEL, THE FATHER OF
GENETICS (Houghton Mifflin Co. ed., 2000); MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS (HarperCollins ed., 1999) (presenting explanations of these
scientific principles in lay terms).
26. Because variety is ubiquitous in nature this constraint is less restrictive than first
impressions. Breeders also use mutagenic techniques to attempt to create new traits within a
species in order to facilitate selective breeding.
27. See Plant Protection Act (PPA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772 (2000). There are three primary
means to transform, or genetically modify, plants. The most common takes advantage of the
unique properties of Agrobacterium tumefaciens, a soil bacteria that infects plants by transferring
a plasmid of its own DNA into the target plant. By modifying the genes contained in this
plasmid, A. tumefaciens infection can be a means to deliver desirable genes into plant cells
instead of the bacteria's own infective genes (which cause Crown Gall disease). Because A.
tumefaciens is a known plant pest, these transformations fall neatly within USDA's regulatory
authority.
By contrast, USDA authority over the other primary methods of transforming plants-the
"biolistics" or "gene gun" method and electroporation-are less clear. These are the various
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crop across species, class, phylum and kingdom. 28 In other words, genetic
engineering enables breeders to recombine genes themselves. 29  Genetic
engineers thereby avoid the main constraint on selective breeding-the need to
start with sexually compatible organisms. This technology can create
organisms that do not-and could not-exist without such intervention.
The early developers of genetic engineering techniques recognized the
potential risks inherent in of their new technology.3 ° To respond to uncertainty
about the possible consequences, the scientific community called for a
voluntary moratorium on genetic engineering, pending further study. 3 1 Under
the auspices of the National Academy of Science, scientists from around the
world met at Asilomar Conference Center in Pine Grove, California, to
hammer out a set of safety precautions for genetic research.32 Known as the
Asilomar Consensus Statement, the conference created a set of guidelines for
genetic engineering research.33 The Asilomar Consensus served as the basis
for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Research
Guidelines issued in 1976.34 These guidelines emphasized the importance of
techniques to which I will refer as "genetic engineering," "bioengineering," "genetic
modification," or "biotechnology."
28. The first step towards the modem biotechnology revolution dates to Watson and Crick's
1953 discovery of the structure of DNA. James Watson and Fredrick Crick, A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). This paper is generally considered to have
ushered in the era of molecular genetics. See also J. Schell, Transgenic Plants as Tools to Study
the Molecular Organization of Plant Genes, 237 SCI. 1176-83 (1987).
29. See, e.g., Stanley Cohen, A. Chang,, Herbert Boyer & Robert Helling, Construction of
Biologically Functional Bacterial Plasmids In Vitro, 70 PROC. NAT. ACAD. Sci. 3240-44 (1973)
(Stanley Cohen and Hubert Boyer had built upon Watson and Crick's work by successfully
splicing a gene from one organism and moving it into another-the first use of recombinant DNA
technology).
30. Stanley N. Cohen, The Manipulation of Genes, SCIENTIFIC AM. 24, 32 (1975). See, e.g.,
Guidelines for Hybrid DNA Molecules, 181 SCI. 114 (1973) (consisting of the letter from Maxine
Singer and Dieter Soil to National Academy of Science and the National Institute of Medicine).
31. Paul Berg et al, Letter from the Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules of the
National Academy of Science, 185 SCI. 303 (1974).
32. Marcia Barinaga, Asilomar Revisited: Lessons for Today? 287 SC1. 1584-85 (2000)
(containing a recent account of that historic meeting); see also HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON SCI. AND
TECH., GENETIC ENGINEERING, HUMAN GENETICS AND CELL BIOLOGY; EVOLUTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES, (SuPP REPORT II) 94 th CONG., 2d Sess. 20, 91-99 (1976).
33. Paul Berg et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCI. 991
(1975) ("(T)he evaluation of potential biohazards has proved to be extremely difficult. It is this
ignorance that has compelled us to conclude that it would be wise to exercise considerable
caution in performing this research."); see, J.P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits, Rights and
Responsibilities: A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019 (1978) (for an interesting account of the self-regulatory project); see also Paul Berg et al.,
Statement of the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT. ACAD.
SCI. USA 1981, 1982 (1975).
34. See Decision of the Director of National Institutes of Health to Release Guidelines for
Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,903 (July 7, 1976). The
guidelines, as updated, are still applicable to research funded by the National Institutes of Health
("NIH") or conducted at NIH, and compliance with the guidelines is a condition for continued
NIH funding.
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full environmental consideration of any possible future release of a genetically
engineered species into the environment. 35  Until 1984, these guidelines-
which applied to researchers funded by NIH-were the only formal regulatory
control over recombinant DNA research.
B. "Ice-Minus" and the Foundation for Economic Trends
The first attempt at commercial application of this new biotechnology in
agriculture came in 1983 when Advanced Genetic Sciences (AGS) applied for
permission to field test a GM bacterium called "Ice-minus". 36 "Ice-minus"
was a genetically modified version of Pseudomonas syringae, a common plant
bacterium. Unmodified P. syringae produces a protein that initiates the
formation of ice crystals when the temperature drops, thereby causing frost
damage to the plant.37 Berkeley researcher Dr. Steve Lindow modified P.
syringae so that it lacked the gene coding for this ice nucleation protein.38
When sprayed on plants, "Ice-minus" bacteria enabled plants to resist frost
damage (hence the name "Ice-minus.").
After greenhouse testing proved successful, AGS applied for permission
to field test the ice-minus bacteria. Through the Recombinant DNA Advisory
Committee, NIH approved the field trials.39 Jeremy Rivkin and the Foundation
35. Id. The accompanying Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) specifically identified
dispersion of GMOs as an environmental hazard posed by these novel organisms. While the 1976
guidelines prohibited deliberate release of GMOs, the 1978 revisions to these guidelines gave
NIH the power to waive the ban on deliberate release. Guidelines for Research Involving
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,109 (Dec. 22, 1978). The guidelines, as updated,
are still applicable to research funded by the NIH or conducted at NIH and compliance with the
guidelines is a condition for continued NIH funding.
36. Notice of Actions Under NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548-50 (June 1, 1983).
37. Frost causes significant damage to crops in the United States. Accordingly, the
potential demand for "Ice-minus" was very high. Were the field tests were successful, "Ice-
minus" might then have offered a "high tech" alterative to the resource and labor intensive frost
protection techniques then in use, such as smug pot and fan use on cold nights, physically
covering of the plants, or adding additional insulation to plant roots. For a description of the
"prior art" that the developers of this modified bacteria intend to replace, see Method for
Reducing Temperature at which Plants Freeze. U.S. Patent No. 4,161,084 (July 3, 1978),
available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect I =PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%
2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-adv.htm&r= 17&p= 1&f=G&I=50&d=PTXT&S I=4161084&OS=
4161084&RS=4161084. See Snow Service, http://www.telemet.com/snow/snomax.asp (last
visited May 2, 2007) (showing, somewhat ironically, that the same ice-nucleating protein the
"Ice-minus" bacterium had been engineered to omit is heavily marketed to ski resorts as a means
to enhance snowmaking, See JGI Microbes, Finished Genome, (2005), http://genome.jgi-
psf.org/finished_microbes/psesy/psesy.home.html (stating that according to the Department of
Energy (DOE), this protein is also used to create artificial ice islands to facilitate offshore oil
drilling in cold oceans such as in the arctic).
38. Microorganism Inhibition of Frost Damage to Plants, U.S. Patent No. 4,432,160
(February 24, 1984), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect I=PTO I &Sect2=
HITOFF&d=PALL&p = I &u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r= I &f=G&l=50&s 1=443
2160.PN.&OS=PN/4432160&RS=PN/4432160.
39. Notice of Actions Under NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
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on Economic Trends ("FET") sued in federal court, arguing that NIH had
failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by
approving the release without conducting an Environmental Impact
Assessment. 40  Among other questions, FET argued that NEPA required an
exploration of how the "Ice-minus" bacteria prevent the growth of the ice-plus
variety, and of the possible effects "Ice-minus" bacteria might have on
ecosystems and even global weather patterns.4 '
Striking themes that continue to haunt regulation of GMOs, the D.C.
Circuit court upheld a lower-court injunction, "emphatically" agreeing that
NIH failed to display rigorous attention to environmental concerns. 42 The D.C.
Circuit directed NIH to consider the "broad[er] environmental issues attendant
on deliberate release" of GMOs. 43 The court found that NIH had completely
failed to consider "the possibility of various environmental effects,"
identifying as the most "glaring deficiency" NIH's failure to consider the
effects of dispersal of the GMOs.4 These failures could have led to extremely
serious consequences-the devastating impact of invasive species on
ecosystems has been well-documented. In an unusually frank
contemporaneous comment, a researcher commented, "You remember the
space program, when all those rockets were blowing up on the launching pad?
Well, the science (of gene-splicing) is at that stage now."45
After the FET lawsuit, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
reviewed and ultimately approved the proposed "Ice-minus" field tests. Local
protests continued to hinder the experiments, as municipalities and citizens
groups objected to having the test plots in their communities. 46 AGS did
Molecules, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548-50 (June 1, 1983).
40. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 147; see Method for Reducing Temperature at which Plants Freeze, U.S. Patent
No. 4,161,084 (July 3, 1978), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect 1=
PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-adv.htm&r = 17&p=l &f-G&l=
50&d=PTXT&SI=4161084&OS-4161084&RS=4161084. In retrospect, this last issue seems
hyperbolic. At the time so little was known about GMOs (and the release was approved with so
little documentation) that the overall tenor of concern seems justified. After all, in order for "Ice-
minus" to work well, it must out-compete--or at least achieve parity with-the native "ice-plus"
bacteria that already inhabit the plants. EPA itself concluded that "Ice-minus" would probably
migrate outside the strawberry patch and could survive indefinitely. See Andrew Maykuth,
Genetic Wonders to Come: Some See Boon, Others Calamity, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (January
10, 1986), available at http://www.maykuth.com/Archives/gene86.htm.
42. Found. on Econ. Trends, 756 F.2d at 146. (During the pendency of the lawsuit, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assumed jurisdiction from NIH).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 153 (The court cites as the only consideration on the record that NIH gave to the
problem of dispersal a single sentence in the administrative record stating that "(a)lthough some
movement of bacteria toward sites near treatment locations by insect or aerial transport is
possible, the numbers of viable cells transported has been shown to be very small; and these cells
are subject to biological and physical processes limiting survival.").
45. Maykuth, supra note 41, (quoting William R. Harvey, then a researcher at Temple
University).
46. Yvonne Baskin, Testing the Future, 10 ALICIA PATTERSON FOUNDATION REPORTER 4
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nothing to help its cause by illegally applying recombinant insects to trees on a
rooftop patio at its Oakland headquarters. The field tests ultimately took place
in 1987 amidst a media storm.4 7
This successful legal challenge forced the Reagan Administration to
develop a more overarching regulatory policy to guide federal decision-making
about agricultural biotechnology research and its products. To that end, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy issued the Coordinated Framework
for Regulation of Biotechnology ("Coordinated Framework"). 48  The
Coordinated Framework, which is described more fully in Part III, continues to
govern regulatory decisions about agricultural biotechnology.
C. The Mid-1990s and Beyond
In February 1994, the first GM food, Calgene's FlavrSavr tomato reached
the market. Despite a great deal of hype, the FlavrSavr was a failure, not
because of concern about biotechnology, but for a very prosaic reason-it did
not taste good. Calgene quietly removed the tomato from the market. The
successful GM crops to date bear modifications designed to facilitate easier or
more profitable growth of the crops, modifications like Bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt) resistance, glyphosate tolerance, or a combination of the two traits. The
first such products reached the market in 1996.49
Since that time, plantings of GM crops have exploded. In 2006, 10.3
million farmers in 22 countries planted 252 million acres with biotech crops. 50
This marked a 60-fold increase from 1996, the first year of commercial
availability. 5 1 Also in 2006, the cumulative acreage dedicated to these novel
(1987), available at http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF I004/Baskin/Baskin.html.
47. Marcia Barinaga, Field Test of Ice-Minus Bacteria Goes Ahead Despite Vandals, 326
NATURE 819 (1987).
48. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June
26, 1986).
49. See generaly, Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Fact Sheet: Genetically
Modified Crops in the United States available at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/
display.php3?FactsheetlD=2 (providing overview of history); Paul Heald, The Problem of Social
Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 87 (2006) (exploring an economic
analysis of GMOs.)
50. See CLIVE JAMES, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS (ISAAA), GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2006 37
(2006), available at http://www.isaaa.org/Resources/Publications/briefs/35/executivesummary/
default.html (last visited May 2, 2007). The ISAAA is a not-for-profit organization that works to
help make biotech crops available in developing countries. Bayer CropScience, Monsanto,
Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred and the UK's Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research
Council, among others, fund the ISAAA. Others have questioned the statistics that ISAAA
compiles, as well as, qualitatively, the portrayal of bottom-up, demand-led expansion of these
crops. See e.g., AARON DEGRASSi, GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND SUSTAINABLE
POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EVIDENCE
(2003), available at http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/view/00010161 .pdf.
51. JAMES, supra note 50, at 37.
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crops exceeded 1 billion acres. 52 The United States continues to account for
the lion's share of these plantings, though non-U.S. plantings-particularly in
India, South Africa and the Philippines-are increasing rapidly. In 2006, GM
crops comprised 89% and 83% of U.S. soybean and cotton acreage
respectively, and 61% of the corn acreage.53
Again, transgenic crops currently on the market were developed primarily
to confer productivity or agricultural management advantages. They may also
have produced some environmental benefits, but only coincidentally.
Supporters of the technology claim that GM crops require fewer herbicide
applications, thus helping the environment.54 Critics not only dispute this
claim of reduced pesticide usage, 55 but also warn of potential dangers,
including threats to the ecosystems into which GM crops are introduced,
decreased genetic biodiversity of crops, and unknown effects to humans from
consuming GM foods.5 6 More generally, critics complain that biotechnology
reinforces industrial agriculture at the expense of more traditional methods of
crop rotation and multiple plantings. There are no foods now on the market
that were genetically engineered to provide retail consumers with improved
quality, nutrition or particular safety benefits, such as reduced pathogens or
allergenicity.
III. THE REGULATORY MATRIX
In theory, no genetically engineered organism is approved for commercial
use until its proponent has demonstrated that the organism conforms with the
standards set by federal law. These standards are intended to protect human
health and the environment, while encouraging the development of new,
potentially lucrative technologies. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and
reality is significant. Part of the problem is that no regulatory agency has a
clear statutory mandate to regulate agricultural biotechnology. As a result,
52. Id.
53. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICAL SERVICE, ACREAGE REPORT (2006) available
at http://usda.mannlib.comell.edu/usda/current/Acre/Acre-09-12-2006.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J.
47, 55 (2001); Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United
States, Trade and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 160, 175 (2005).
55. Steve Connor, Farmers Use as Much Pesticide with GM Crop, US Study Finds, The
Independent (July 27, 2006) available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0727-
06.htm; see also Charles M. Benbrook, Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the
United States: The First Nine Years, available at http://www.biotech-info.net/Fullversion_
first nine.pdf.
56. Union of Concerned Scientists, "Risks of Genetic Engineering", available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/food and environment/geneticengineering/risks-of-genetic-engineering.
html. Cf generally, websites devoted, in part, to this issue: Center for Science in the Public
Interest, http://www.cspinet.org/biotech/; Friends of the Earth. http://www.foe.org/camps/
comm/safefood/biopharm/index.html; and Greenpeace, http://www.greenpeace.org/internationaU
campaigns/genetic-engineering. There are a host of critical writings, far too many to adequately
cite here.
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there are no coherent overarching government policies capable of ensuring that
this new technology is safely explored and exploited.
A. Birth of a regulatory regime-OSTP during the Reagan Years
In response to the successful Foundation on Economics Trend lawsuit
described above, the Reagan administration convened an interagency working
group to consider how to regulate biotechnology. The working group was
explicitly tasked with achieving a "balance between regulation adequate to
ensure health and environmental safety while maintaining sufficient regulatory
flexibility to avoid impeding the growth of an infant industry. 57 In its 1984
proposal for the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) made the goals of the
Coordinated Framework clear. Although it began with a clear statement that
"(t)he fundamental purpose of the Working Group is to insure that the
regulatory process adequately considers health and environmental safety
consequences of the products and processes of the new biotechnology as they
move from the research laboratory to the marketplace," 58 the proposal focused
far more on the needs of industry for "sensible" regulation that would not stifle
innovation than on the needs of the public for rigorous regulation to protect
public safety.59  The proposal similarly emphasized the United States'
commitment to reducing barriers to trade in biotechnology.60 A comparable
degree of commitment to preserving environmental safety is less evident in
either the proposal or the ultimately adopted Coordinated Framework.
The Coordinated Framework purported to describe the comprehensive
57. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302-01,
23303 (June 26, 1986).
58. Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50856, 50857
(December 31, 1984).
59. Id. The proposal provided in relevant part:
The Working Group recognizes the need for a coordinated and sensible regulatory
review process that will minimize the uncertainties and inefficiencies that can stifle
innovation and impair the competitiveness of U.S. industry....
The importance of addressing the emerging commercial aspects of biotechnology in a
coordinated and timely fashion is captured in the recent report by the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment which warned: 'Although the United States is
currently the world leader in both basic science and commercial development of new
biotechnology, continuation of the initial preeminence of American companies in the
commercialization of new biotechnology is not assured.'
Id. This focus on competitiveness reflected a contemporaneous sense that the United States
had lost its competitive edge in the electronics industry. Determined to ensure that the nascent
biotechnology industry did not suffer the same fate, the government sent a clear message that
"regulatory agencies were not to stand in the way of biotechnology." See, Mary Jane Angelo,
Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of First
Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 105, 171 n. 328 (2006). As a result, there
was no new legislation directly responsive to the challenges posed by biotechnology, and
agencies instead adapted existing regulatory programs.
60. Coordinated Framework, supra note 57, at 23303.
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federal regulatory policy for ensuring the safety of biotechnology research and
products. It announced that no new laws would be needed to respond to
challenges posed by this new technology. Instead, products of biotechnology
would be regulated under "a mosaic" of existing laws based upon the products'
intended use. Thus, food would be regulated under the Federal Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act, pesticides under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide Pesticide and
Rodenticide Act, agricultural plants under the Plant Protection Act, and so
on. 61 EPA and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) are
involved before GM crops can be produced commercially and thus regulate the
environmental release of plants derived from agro-biotechnology. The United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), on the other hand, has regulatory
authority only over the marketing of GM crops as food for humans and
animals. 62 Each agency regulates under the authority of a handful of federal
statutes, each with its own mission and regulatory structure, none of which
were enacted to address biotechnology.63
The Coordinated Framework offered some framing principles for U.S.
regulation: biotechnology poses no unique risks; the products of biotechnology
should be regulated, not the process; existing laws should be used to regulate
the products of biotechnology (no new legislation is needed); and any gaps
should be addressed through coordination among agencies and designation of
lead agencies as appropriate.
The central principle behind the Coordinated Framework is the idea of
"substantial equivalence" 64 -that GMOs are functionally equivalent to their
unmodified counterparts and should be treated accordingly. A major problem
with "substantial equivalence" is that it permits agencies to act simultaneously
as regulators and promoters for this new technology. The conflict is
particularly acute at USDA, which has a statutory mission of developing new
markets for the United States' agriculture.
The Coordinated Framework assumes that "(b)y the time a genetically
engineered product is ready for commercialization, it will have undergone
substantial review and testing during the research phase, and thus, information
regarding its safety should be available." 65 However, the limited nature of
regulatory review shapes the development of safety information in a fashion
that does not promote a full consideration of all risks associated with these
novel organisms. Because of the assumption of substantial equivalence, the
onus and burden of proof is on the authorities to prove that a GMO is unsafe
61. Id.
62. See Rebecca Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink
Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 593, 605 (Spring 2003).
63. Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297, 312 (2002).
64. See, e.g., Jan-Peter Nap et al., The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the
Environment, 33 PLANT J. 1, 10 (2003); Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn:
Public Health and Biopharming, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 371, 390 (2004).
65. See generally, Coordinated Framework, supra note 57.
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before they may impose use restrictions. This is directly contrary to the
European approach and has led to jockeying in the international trade
context. 6
6
B. Current United States Regulatory Practices
The Coordinated Framework remains the United States' basic organizing
principle for regulating GMOs. The Coordinated Framework fits the products
of genetic engineering into an already-existing set of laws and regulations.
Because these laws were drafted before the development of this technology,
they are not always well suited to their new tasks. With no single agency
considering the full range of problems posed by GM crops, regulatory gaps are
inevitable. Each agency concentrates on its own narrow piece of the GM
universe while overarching questions of safety often go unexplored.
At its most superficial, the regulatory regime established by the
Coordinated Framework is very easy to describe: the FDA is responsible for
food safety, the EPA is responsible for microbes and pesticides, and USDA's
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for all
plants. In practice, however, the regulatory interactions are far more complex
than this deceptively simple division of authority. Many GM products fall into
multiple categories. For example, a corn plant that has been engineered to
produce its own pesticide is a plant, a pesticide, and a food, so it falls under the
purview of all three agencies. Each of the three agencies uses different laws to
govern the products of biotechnology, and most of these laws were passed well
before the advent of biotechnology. What follows is a brief overview of the
relevant regulatory regimes.
1. FDA
FDA is responsible for food safety under the authority of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).67 This Act empowers FDA to, inter
alia: identify and remove adulterated foods from the human food supply,
regulate food labeling, and approve all food additives. The FDCA applies to
all food, including GM foods. However, no statutory provisions of the FDCA
expressly regulate GMOs, nor do any FDA regulations specifically apply to
these novel foods. Instead, FDA treats GM foods, again, as the "substantial
equivalent" of conventional foods. As a result, foods produced from plants
modified through genetic engineering are not treated any differently from
conventional foods.
The FDCA authorizes FDA to protect the food supply from becoming
"adulterated," meaning from foods that "bear[] or contain[] any poisonous or
66. For a discussion of these differences, see Rebecca Bratspies, Trail Smelter's
(semi)Precautionary Legacy, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (R. BRATSPIES AND R. MILLER, EDS, 2006).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 301,etseq.
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deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health. 68 FDA also has
authority to regulate food additives, defined as substances that are intended for
use in food, that may reasonably be expected to become a component of food,
or that otherwise may affect the characteristics of food.6 9 A food additive must
receive FDA approval prior to its use in a food product. Both the gene inserted
into a transgenic food plant and the protein produced by that gene clearly fall
within the definition of food additives.
In theory, this regulatory framework should give FDA all the regulatory
authority it needs to effectively oversee GM food crops.70 In practice it does
not work that way. FDA treats GM foods as the substantial equivalent of
conventional crops, a crucial regulatory decision that drastically limits the
scope of FDA's review. Under this "substantial equivalence" analysis, GM
crops are treated as mere variants of existing, well-accepted foods with no
different or greater safety concerns.
The FDCA contains a provision exempting food additives that are
"generally regarded as safe" (GRAS) from the requirement of pre-market
approval and/or labeling. Relying upon the principle of substantial
equivalence, FDA determined that "(i)n most cases, the substances expected to
become components of food as a result of genetic modification of a plant will
be the same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found in food,
such as proteins, fats and oils, and carbohydrates." In light of this
determination, FDA presumes that most GMOs will be GRAS. 7 In fact, FDA
justified its decision not to mandate specific labeling for foods derived from
GM plants based upon this GRAS presumption.
It is the food additive manufacturer, not the FDA that determines whether
a GMO is GRAS in the first instance. A manufacturer need not report a GRAS
determination to FDA, but the agency does offer a voluntary consultation
process. 72 Thus, at most, the vaunted FDA pre-market "approval" of GMOs
amounts to FDA reviewing GRAS determinations that manufacturers
68. Federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2000).
69. 21 U.S.C. §348(a) (2000).
70. FDA has no authority over "biopharmed" or industrial crops as they are not intended to
produce foods. However, the possibility of cross-contamination is significant. FDA, of course,
has regulatory authority over any drugs produced from biopharming, under its normal drug
approval process. However, that drug approval process will not consider the potential health
effects of cross-contamination from biopharm crops.
71. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 408 (2002); see also Jeffrey K. Francer,
Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?: Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in the United
States and European Union, 7 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 270 (2000). This GRAS presumption
was challenged in court, and upheld, in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166
(D.D.C. 2000).
72. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22984,
(May 29, 1992); GUIDANCE ON CONSULTATION PROCEDURES: FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW
PLANT VARIETIES (October 1997) available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-rd/consulpr.html.
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voluntarily submit for review. 73
Critics label this reliance on "substantial equivalence" as misguided
because it relies wholly on chemical similarity, with no biological,
toxicological, or immunological data to back up the assumption of safety. This
regulatory policy does not seem to contemplate the possibility that a company
might perpetuate a fraud by concealing important information about a GM
food. Most of the time, food manufacturers have a fairly clear incentive not to
expose the public to known risks, but known risks are not the main concern.
This policy creates little incentive for manufacturers to explore possible risks
and to develop the kind of information that would enable a full assessment of
food safety.
In January 2001, the FDA proposed regulations that would have required
manufacturers to submit data and information about plant-derived
bioengineered foods or animal feeds at least 120 days prior to commercial
distribution.74  This mandatory process would have replaced the voluntary
consultation process. It would also have required companies to provide FDA
with data and information on plant-derived bioengineered foods to be
consumed by humans or animals.75 One of the first acts of the incoming Bush
administration was to suspend and withdraw these rules for further
consideration. 76 They have never been reissued.
In June 2006, FDA issued new guidance encouraging manufacturers to
contact the agency early in their product development process in order to
address safety issues. 77 The recommendation focused on avoiding "possible
intermittent, inadvertent introductions into the food supply of proteins from
biotech crops under development. '78  This recommendation has not been
applied to plants engineered to endogenously produce pesticides, or to be
resistant to herbicide application-the overwhelming majority of GMOs
currently on the market.
Although FDA is tasked with both enforcing EPA tolerances for
73. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, LIST OF COMPLETED CONSULTATIONS ON
BIOENGINEERED FOODS, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov//-lrd/biocon.html.
74. See Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4706-38
(proposed January 19, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592).
75. Press Release, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, FDA Announces
Proposal and Draft Guidance for Food Developed Through Biotechnology (Jan. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/hhbioen3.html.
76. Memorandum from the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, White House
Office, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg.
7702 (January 24, 2001) (directing that regulations sent to the Office of the Federal Register, but
not yet published, be withdrawn, and that regulations already published but not yet in effect be
postponed).
77. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EARLY FOOD SAFETY
EVALUATION OF NEW NON-PESTICIDAL PROTEINS PRODUCED BY NEW PLANT VARIETIES
INTENDED FOR FOOD USE, available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/04d-0369-
gdl0002.pdf.
78. Id. at 3-4.
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pesticides in food and removing food contaminated with unapproved pesticides
or the unintended, unauthorized presence of unapproved transgenic material,7 9
it neither engages in any systematic compliance-monitoring of GM foods nor
monitoring of the same for contamination. This point of concern will become
even more pressing once GMOs developed elsewhere in the world begin to
reach the international commodities market. Such GMOs may be imported
into the United States without pre-market FDA approval or subsequent FDA
monitoring. A number of recent legislative proposals would have statutorily
expanded FDA's oversight of GMOs,80 but, to date, none of these proposals
have made it out of committee.
2. EPA
EPA's authority over GM crops stems largely from its regulatory
oversight over the human health and environmental consequences of
pesticides, arising under both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 81 and the FDCA.8 2 This responsibility includes the
duty to determine acceptable tolerances for pesticide residues in food. Because
most of the GM crops currently on the market have been genetically modified
to produce endogenous pesticides, EPA plays a critical regulatory role.
EPA has interpreted FIFRA's pesticide registration provisions to
encompass plant produced pesticides (so-called "plant incorporated
protectants" or "PIPs"). No plant that has been modified to endogenously
produce a pesticide can be sold unless registered under FIFRA. Registration
requires a demonstration that there will be no unsafe environmental or human
dietary effects. As part of this analysis, no such GM food crop can lawfully be
sold for planting until EPA has either established a tolerance level for the
endogenously produced pesticide or has exempted the GMO from the tolerance
requirement.8 3 In the absence of a duly promulgated tolerance or exemption,
79. The unintended contamination of food crops with unauthorized and unapproved genetic
material is a growing problem. See Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance, supra note 62;
Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 64, at 386-90.
80. Among the many introduced bills, H.R. 4813, the Genetically Engineered Food Safety
Act, would have "amend[ed] the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to the
safety" of biotech foods. Genetically Engineered Food Safety Act of 2002, H.R. 4813, 107th
Cong. (2002). This bill would have required a pre-market agency determination that a GMO is
safe for human consumption, and it would have given the FDA a right to impose independent
testing and to seek input from the National Academy's Institute of Medicine. Id. Similarly, S.
3095, the Genetically Engineered Foods Act, would have required that FDA to review and
approve all genetically engineered foods prior to introduction into interstate commerce.
Genetically Engineered Foods Act, S. 3095, 107th Cong. (2002). State legislatures are quite
active in this area as well. For further information, see Pew Initiative on Biotechnology,
Factsheet: State Legislative Activity Related to Agricultural Biotechnology in 2005-2006,
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/legislation/factsheet.php.
81. 7 U.S.C. §136a(a)(2000). EPA's pesticide regulations are set out in 40 C.F.R. pts. 150-
189.
82. See FIFRA and FDCA, as clarified by the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
83. EPA may, by regulation, exempt any pesticide from some or all of the requirements of
2007] BRA TSPIES: THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN APPROACH 411
or if the residue level detected in food exceeds the tolerance, the food is
deemed adulterated under the FDCA and is subject to enforcement by FDA.84
To date, EPA has registered only a few endogenously produced pesticides, and
with one exception, all have been crops with genes that encode Bt proteins.85
EPA has granted many of these Bt crops exemptions from the requirement for
a tolerance level.86
Under FIFRA, EPA has no regulatory authority over plants that do not
produce pesticides. Thus, EPA's regulatory authority is narrow, and notably, it
does not cover biopharmed crops, or crops modified to be resistant to
herbicides.
3. USDA
USDA's primary duty with regard to genetically engineered crops is to
evaluate whether there is risk that a novel organism will pose a plant pest risk
when introduced into the environment or interstate commerce. USDA
interprets this authority narrowly, treating GM crops exactly like their
conventional counterparts and evaluating them for the same risks.
Under the Plant Protection Act, USDA has the authority to adopt
regulations preventing the introduction and dissemination of plant pests. 87
Pursuant to this authority, USDA, through APHIS, regulates "organisms and
products altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or
are believed to be plant pests." 88  The statute's implementing regulations
define a plant pest as "(a)ny living . . . [organism] . . . which can directly or
FIFRA, if the pesticide is "of a character which is unnecessary to be subject to" FIFRA in order
to carry out the purposes of the Act. 7 U.S.C. § I 36w(b)(2) (2000). EPA generally exempts
pesticides that pose low probabilities of risk to the environment in the absence of regulatory
oversight. See Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for
Plant Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides), 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19 2001)
(Pesticides that do not qualify for exemption can still be approved for specific uses, but only if
they do not "cause unreasonable adverse effects.").
84. FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 408(1) defines any pesticide chemical residue contained in food as
adulterated unless EPA has exempted the pesticide from the tolerance requirement, or EPA has
issued a tolerance level and the residue in question complies with that tolerance level.
85. See Donna U. Vogt, U.S. Congressional Research Service, Food Biotechnology in the
United States: Science, Regulation, and Issues RL30198 tbl. 2, 15 (Jan. 19, 2001).
86. Many Bt genes, and their proteins, have not shown toxicity to humans. EPA has
therefore typically granted the Bt crops exemptions from the requirement for a tolerance level.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (2002) (exempting CryIA(c)), 40 C.F.R. §180.1173 (2002)
(exempting CryIA(b)). For an explanation of these decisions to exempt certain Bt genes and
proteins, see 40 C.F.R. § 180.1173 (1996); see also 40 C.F.R. § 180.1155 (1995).
87. PPA, 7 U.S.C. § 7711 (a).
88. 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n.1; see generally, Introduction of Organisms and Products
Altered or Produced Through Genetic Engineering Which are Plant Pests or Which There is
Reason to Believe are Plant Pests, 7 C.F.R. § 340 et seq. This definition may exclude the
growing number of plants that are transformed using "gene gun" technology rather than through
agrobacterium transformation. For an explanation of these techniques and their differences, see
BRATSPIES, supra note 24, at 9.
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indirectly injure[] or cause[] disease or damage in or to any plant." 89
APHIS's regulatory oversight of products of modem biotechnology is
narrowly focused on whether these novel organisms might pose such a risk.90
APHIS thus permits GM plants to be deregulated if field tests show that the
GMO will not pose a plant pest risk.9 1 In conducting this regulatory review,
APHIS treats GM crops exactly like their conventional counterparts and
evaluates them for exactly the same risks. APHIS does not consider whether
planting a GM crop modified to be resistant to a herbicide is likely to spread
the trait of resistance more generally, nor does the agency consider the possible
contamination that might result from pollen drift from GM plants to
unmodified plants.
Like its sister agencies, APHIS starts from the assumption that products
developed through biotechnology are "substantially equivalent" to their
conventional counterparts. Indeed, the Coordinated Framework expects that in
most cases, genetically engineered crops "will be improved, and would
therefore not pose any new threat to humans, other animal species, or to the
environment. '92 A 1988 analysis by the General Accounting Office (now the
Government Accountability Office) (GAO) roundly criticized shortcomings in
USDA's oversight, echoing calls by the scientific community that certain
regulatory decisions were "scientifically indefensible." 93 In particular, GAO
criticized the decision to exempt certain categories of GMOs from regulatory
scrutiny "prior to developing scientific information on the behavior of these
organisms in the environment. '" 94
Moreover, APHIS typically does not require permits for field testing of
GM food crops but instead permits purveyors to proceed under a notification
procedure. 95 Since 1987, APHIS has authorized more than 10,000 field tests of
GM crops. 96 Once a GM crop has been field tested, its developer can petition
for non-regulated status and approval for commercial sales. 97  After a
deregulation petition is granted, the subject plant is no longer considered a
regulated article and is no longer subject to APHIS's oversight. More than 60
89. 7 C.F.R. §340.1.
90. For a detailed discussion, see generally, Bratspies, Illusions of Care, supra note 63.
91. For a description of this process, see Petition for Determination of Nonregulated Status,
7 C.F.R. § 340.6(a) (2003). After receiving a petition, USDA publishes a notice in the Federal
Register and accepts comments for sixty days. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d)(2) (2003). USDA has one
hundred and eighty days to deny or approve the petition. 7 C.F.R. § 340.6(d)(3) (2003).
92. Coordinated Framework, supra note 48, at 23339.
93. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Biotechnology: Managing the Risks of Field Testing
Genetically Engineered Organisms, GAO/RCED-88-27, at 48 (June 1988).
94. Id. at 3.
95. Notification for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. § 340.3(a)
(2003). This position contrasts sharply with the European Union's regulatory approach.
96. BRS Factsheet: Biotechnology Regulatory Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/content/printable-version/BRS FSFedR
eg_02-06.pdf (February 2006).
97. Restriction on the Introduction of Regulated Articles, 7 C.F.R. §340.0(a)(1) (2002).
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genetically engineered plants have been deregulated under this process. Most
of these deregulated plants endogenously produce the pesticide Bt or are
engineered to be tolerant to herbicide exposure (or both traits in
combination).9 8
The second generation of GM plants pose an even greater challenge to
adequate USDA regulation, particularly "biopharm" 99 crops that produce
industrial or pharmaceutical compounds. Because the biopharm crops are not
intended for food, they fall entirely outside FDA's regulatory authority.
Because they do not produce pesticides, they similarly are not within EPA's
purview. By elimination, USDA stands as the sole regulatory agency.
Unfortunately, USDA has little experience or familiarity with the non-food
compounds involved in biopharming, °° some of which are known to have
deleterious effects on human health. 10 1 A limited "plant pest" analysis will not
begin to cover the myriad risks that accompany the exciting new possibilities
offered by these crops.
C. Gaps and Overlaps
The United States regulatory system for GMOs is a complex net woven
from pre-existing regulatory strands. The problem is that, like all nets, this
regulatory net has holes. Among the holes or gaps associated with
biotechnology, some of the most pressing include: the risk of transferring
herbicide resistance from crops to weeds.; the prospect of biopharm industrial
or pharmaceutical compounds entering the food chain;, the lack of consumer
choice because bio-engineered food is not labeled as such;, the introduction
new allergens and toxins into the food chain.; and the certainty of unexpected
consequences. Indeed, even USDA's Advisory Committee on Biotechnology
and 2 1st Century Agriculture concedes that statutes written before the
development of modem biotechnology "may not be optimal to meet the needs
of producers and consumers."' 10 2 These statutes simply fail to cover the range
of problems posed by GM crops. In particular, the advisory committee pointed
to a few notable gaps in the United States regulatory scheme-transgenic
animals, biopharming, adventitious presence, and the need to address imports
of GMOs developed in other countries.10 3
98. Id.
99. See infra note 100 (discussing "biopharming").
100. Industry's preferred term for this process is "plant made pharmaceuticals" or PMPs.
Because I believe this term obscures the GM nature of these plants in an attempt to deflect
conversation about the troubling issues their production raises, I deliberately choose to use the
term biopharming.
101. See Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 64, at 382-386,
102. USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century Agriculture,
Opportunities and Challenges in Agricultural Biotechnology: The Decade Ahead 5 (July 13,
2006) available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/final-mainreport-v6.pdf. Despite this
caveat, the overall tenor of this report was optimistic.
103. Id.
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For example, the primary strategy for preventing cross-contamination
between GM crops and conventional or organic crops are physical containment
measures. Physical containment measures involve using planting distances or
timing to prevent contamination of conventional crops with GM crops.
Unfortunately, for existing GM crops, physical contamination measures have
largely been ineffectual, either because the requirements are too lenient or
because they are not being implemented. Indeed, a 2003 USDA survey found
that approximately 20% of farms growing GM crops failed to comply with
planting regulations intended to ensure physical containment.
1 0 4
Industry trade groups acknowledge that cross-pollination, adventitious
commingling and other "causes" make it virtually impossible to assure that any
U.S.-origin com shipment is 100% non-GMO. 10 5 The same holds true for
soybeans. There is no comprehensive domestic policy regarding adventitious
presence of transgenic events in seed, grain, or food. This problem will only
become more significant as other countries begin to develop and approve
GMOs and thereafter seek approval to import these new organisms into the
United States. There are real questions about whether the United States
regulatory system will be able to cope with the possibilities that arise from
considering the problem of contamination and adventitious presence of novel
organisms that have not been through the United States regulatory procedures.
IV. REGULATORY FAILURES
Although this section is captioned regulatory failures, the author does not
mean to suggest that agricultural biotechnology itself has been a failure. To
the contrary, the story of GM crops to date includes significant successes as
well as failures. On the success side, these crops have been extremely
profitable for their manufacturers, and for the growers that have elected to
plant them. The crops have produced increased yields, reduced damage from
104. Emily Gerseney, USDA Survey Shows Biotech Rules Breaches, WASHINGTON POST,
Sept. 10, 2003. The survey itself can be found at http://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/
Corn and BiotechnologySpecial Analysis/bioc0703.pdf. An in-depth analysis of the prior
year's data, conducted by the Center for Science in the Public Interest, reached similar
conclusions. See, Gregory Jaffe, Planting Trouble: Are Farmers Squandering Bt Corn
Technology?, at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/bt-corn_report.pdf (June 19, 2003) (analyzing USDA
data).
105. See Organic Trade Association, Comments on Proposed Free Trade Agreement With
the Republic of Korea (March 23, 2006) available at http://www.ota.com/
pp/otaposition/frc/USTR/03-23-06.html; Drew L. Kershen and Alan McHughen, CAST
Commentary: Adventitious Presence: Inadvertent Commingling and Coexistence Among
Farming Methods, (July 2005) available at http://www.cast-science.org/websiteUploads/
publicationPDFs/advenpresence%20rev.pdf; Pew Initiative on Biotechnology, Detecting
Genetically Modified Organisms: Confronting the Limits of Testing to Resolve a Biotech Food
Fight, available at http://pewagbiotech.org/events/0225/proceedings.pdf. (discussing the
problem); CropChoice, Is GMO-free Production Possible? Costs and Methods of Crop
Segregation, (November 23, 2001) available at http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstryd5d6-
2.html?recid=517.
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some common pests, and in some cases have reduced pesticide applications.
These successes are relatively straightforward and easy to understand from a
bottom line business perspective.
Understanding the failures associated with agricultural biotechnology, by
contrast, involves exploring the existing regulatory structure and measuring it
against a vision of what regulation is supposed to accomplish in society. As
such, it is a much more complex process that is far less intuitive. In light of
this disparity between easy-to-understand successes, and difficult-to-grasp
failures, the bulk of this section is devoted to teasing out those failures.
On many levels, the story of regulating GMOs in the United States has
been a story of failure-failure on the part of industry to comply with laws and
regulations promulgated to protect the public's safety and failure by both
regulators and industry to take seriously the possibilities that this technology
might contaminate the food supply or wreak environmental havoc. The
meteoric rise of biotech crops only increases the urgency to study these failures
with an eye towards overcoming them. The kinds of failures detailed below
cannot be characterized as isolated incidents but must instead be considered the
context in which these crops are sold, grown and harvested. The scope and
scale of these regulatory failures is a powerful argument for caution going
forward.
A. Failures of Regulatory Enforcement
In December of 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of
Inspector General (OIG) released a damning audit of USDA practices with
regard to genetically engineered crops. 10 6 Among the violations cited were:
failure to monitor whether GM crops were segregated, failure to test for
contamination during and after field trials, failure to comply with shipping
requirements designed to prevent inadvertent dispersal of unapproved GM
crops, and failure to follow up on storage and disposal requirements. 107
The OIG concluded that weaknesses in the agency's internal management
controls undermine its ability to oversee successfully the safe development of
genetically engineered organisms.' 0 8 In particular, the OIG concluded that
APHIS did not comply with its own policy on the frequency of field test
inspections and publicly understated the percentage of infractions it discovered
in such inspections. 0 9 Since APHIS trumpets a low infraction rate as evidence
106. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Audit Report: Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service Controls Over Issuance of Genetically Engineered Organism Release Permits, Audit
50601-8-Te, http://www.usda.gov.oig/webdocs/506010080TE.pdf (Dec. 2005) (hereinafter "OIG
Audit").
107. Id.
108. Id. at iv.
109. For instance, the OIG found that Plant Protection and Quarantine officers, the
government officials who actually conduct the inspections, did not report or pursue the
overwhelming majority of violations discovered during joint PPQ/OIG inspections. Id. at 9. Thus,
the Biotechnology Regulatory Service (BRS) compliance infraction database improperly
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that its monitoring program is effective, this latter finding is particularly
troubling.
Further underscoring the tenuous nature of APHIS's compliance statistics,
the OIG concluded that APHIS failed to obtain critical information necessary
to carry out its oversight responsibility.' 10 As a result, the agency lacks basic
information about the field test sites it approves and, at least in theory,
monitors."' For example, APHIS does not even know where or whether the
test fields have been planted." 12 Without that knowledge, the agency has no
way to monitor compliance with the safety requirements that are the legal
prerequisite for obtaining permission to grow experimental genetically
engineered crops. The Union of Concerned Scientists recently documented
these agency failures to monitor and enforce regulations as of most concern
from a human safety perspective-those modified to produce pharmaceutical
compounds. " 
3
The OIG also found that APHIS does not require reporting of containment
protocols for plantings conducted under the notification procedure or of the
final disposition of experimental crops. 1 4 Also, the OIG observed APHIS as
extremely lax in pursuing delinquent field test reports, including information
about environmental harms stemming from the tests. Since the major thrust of
APHIS oversight is that it require applicants to follow procedures that will
minimize the chance of inadvertent introduction of material from these
unapproved genetically engineered crops to food crops, agriculture, the
environment, and the food supply, these weaknesses cut to the very heart of the
regulatory process and bring its legitimacy and competence into question.
Moreover, the OIG criticized APHIS's inspection protocols as too informal
and uncoordinated to be an effective regulatory compliance tool. 115 As a
result, even when inspectors are sent into the field, they are hamstrung.
Overall, the OIG concluded that APHIS "is relinquishing its regulatory
suggested a far lower rate of violations than were uncovered by inspections.
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id. at 14-18.
112. Id. at 6-8. APHIS may not know any more than the business address of the applicant,
or the state and county in which the experimental test fields are planted.
113. Union of Concerned Scientists, UCS Uncovers Lax USDA Oversight of Pharma
Crops, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/food-and-environmentgeneticengineering/usda-
ventria-oversight.html (last visited September 9, 2007) (documenting APHIS failures with regard
to pharma rice grown in North Carolina).
114. OIG Audit, supra note 106, at 13. Since these protocols are supposed to be the vehicle
by which applicants detail their plans for containing the experimental GM crop within the test
site, this lack is particularly troubling. In May of 2005, APHIS began requiring that written
protocols be made available at the time of inspection. However, that change does not solve the
problem. Without reviewing and approving these protocols before a notification planting, APHIS
has no way of knowing whether the applicant's procedures will meet the performance standards
imposed by regulation. Indeed, the OIG states that in a 2001 survey of notification protocols,
APHIS discovered that some protocols may not be adequate to meet APHIS's field test
performance standards. Id. at 22.
115. Id. at 28.
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responsibilities in favor of self-certification"' 1 6 by GMO purveyors.
Substantive review and oversight is replaced with blind acceptance of
unverified industry promises to comply with performance standards. In the
face of overwhelming evidence that these promises are not being kept," 7
APHIS nevertheless refuses to put more stringent oversight and control
protocols in place.
B. Failures of Regulatory Intent
In the past few years, a spate of court decisions have found that the
agencies charged with administering the Coordinated Framework have failed
to carry out their duties to protect the public and the environment. Two recent
decisions finding that agency conduct violated the National Environmental
Policy Act, (NEPA) might be particularly instructive for how courts will
evaluate agency decisions into the future. NEPA instructs federal agencies to
conduct a "coherent and upfront environmental analysis" to ensure informed
decision making. 1 8 Whenever substantial questions are raised as to whether a
project may cause significant (environmental) degradation, NEPA requires that
agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of their planned action
in order to ensure that the agency "will not act on incomplete information, only
to regret its decision after it is too late to correct."'"19 These two cases decided
the same week in February-Geertsons Seed Farms v. Johanns, and
International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns'20 both criticized
USDA for failing to fulfill its NEPA obligations before permitting release of a
GM crop into the environment.
1. Geertsons Farm and GM Alfalfa
In 2005, APHIS granted Monsanto's petition to deregulate "Roundup
Ready" alfalfa, a genetically modified version of alfalfa engineered to be
resistant to Monsanto's "Roundup" herbicide.' 2 1 Organic and conventional
farmers sued in federal court, challenging APHIS's decision to deregulate GM
alfalfa without first conducting an environmental impact statement (EIS). The
farmers alleged various significant impacts that necessitated an EIS, inter alia:
that use of GM alfalfa would contaminate their non-GM alfalfa crops 122 and
116. Id. at vi.
117. For example, according to the OIG Audit, the overwhelming majority of the shipments
of experimental genetically engineered seeds in the United States occur in a fashion that violates
APHIS regulations intended to ensure that unapproved genetically engineered seeds do not
contaminate the environment or escape into the wild. Id. at 8.
118. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (91h Cir. 1998)
(citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)).
119. Marsh, supra note 119, at 371.
120. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. 2007); International
Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.C. 2007).
121. Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability Determination of
Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide
Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg. 36917-01 (June 27, 2005).
122. Because alfalfa is pollinated by bees, there is a real possibility of insect-mediated
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that planting of GM alfalfa would increase the likelihood that glyphsate
resistance would develop in weed plants.1 23 In a February 2007 decision that
echoed the concerns raised by the very first field trial of a GM crop, a
California District court agreed with the farmers, describing the decision not to
conduct an EIS as "cavalier."' 124  In particular, the court applied the same
adjective to APHIS's explanation for its decision not to require an EIS, which
hinged on the assertion that "weed species often develop resistance to
herbicides."'' 25 Rather than a rationale not to consider the development of such
resistance to be a "significant environmental impact" for purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 126 the fact that resistance is a
likely or possible occurrence would seem to require an EIS. APHIS further
stated that "good stewardship" is the primary means of staving off resistance
(and presumably contamination of non-GM crops), yet the "finding of no
significant impact" (FONSI) contains no definition or description of what
kinds of conduct amounts to "good stewardship.' 2 7
The court also decried APHIS's failure to consider the cumulative
impacts of its decision to deregulate crops that have been genetically modified
pollen transmission from GM alfalfa to conventional or organic crops. Such transmission has
been documented at distances of two miles. USDA/APHIS, Monsanto Company and Forage
Genetics International Petition 04-1 10-01p for Determination of Non-Regulated Status for
Roundup Ready Alfalfa Events J 101 and J 163, Environmental Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact at 4 (June 14, 2005) available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
brs/aphisdocs/04_l 1 0 0 1pea.pdf (hereafter USDA/APHIS Alfalfa FONSI); Monsanto
acknowledges that bee-mediated gene flow occurs and that adequate isolation is the preferred
method for preventing such gene flow. Petition for Determination of Non-Regulated Status:
Roundup Ready Alfalfa (Medicago sativa L) Events J101 and J163, at 285-86, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/04_ 100 1p.pdf. Nonetheless, APHIS's decision to
wholly deregulate Roundup Ready alfalfa-removing the crop from APHIS's jurisdiction-
means that there will be no regulatory segregation controls whatsoever imposed upon GM alfalfa,
let alone controls sufficient to ensure that GM alfalfa was not grown within two miles of
conventional or organic alfalfa. Because 75% of the U.S. alfalfa crop is exported to Japan, and
Japan has not approved GM alfalfa, these farmers are concerned that they will lose a $500 million
dollar export market. USDA/APHIS Alfalfa FONSI, at 3. Geertson Seed Farms, Complaint
2006 WL 1417538, at pars. 12, 14. 31, 34, 123. Organic farmers have the additional concern that
contamination of their organic crops by GM alfalfa will destroy their ability to farm organically.
Id. APHIS specifically rejected this latter concern on the ground that it would be up to organic
farmers to develop protocols to prevent contamination. USDA/APHIS Alfalfa FONSI, at 5-6.
123. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 119-121 and 123,
Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
124. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624 at * 15; see also Andrew Pollack, U.S. Agency
Violated Law in Seed Case, Judge Rules, NEW YORK TIMES (February 14, 2007). The court
subsequently issued a preliminary injunction. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 776146
(N.D. Cal. March 12, 2007).
125. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624 at *9.
126. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq. NEPA serves as the
"basic national charter for protection of the environment." 40 C.F.R. § 1500. 1(a). Whenever the
consequences of a major federal action raise substantial questions "as to whether a project may
cause significant [environmental] degradation" the agency must produce an environmental impact
statement. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371.
127. Geertsons Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624 at *9.
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to be resistant to glyphosate. Noting that "while the deregulation of one crop
in and of itself might not pose a significant risk for the development of
glyphosate resistant weeds, when all the crops are considered cumulatively
such a risk may become apparent,"' 128 the court found that APHIS had failed to
take the "hard look"'129 required under NEPA. In fact, the Environmental
Assessment specifically excluded the so-called "separate issue of the potential
use of the herbicide glyphosate in conjunction with these plants."'3 °
This division of inquiry smacks of sophistry. Farmers purchase and plant
crops that have been genetically modified to be glyphosate resistant in order to
take advantage of that resistance by using glyphosate to control weeds. It
makes no sense to consider the environmental impact of the plants without
doing so in the context that farmers planting the crop do so with the intention
of using glyphosate to control weeds.
Once again, the Coordinate Framework creates gaps that hinder, rather
than advance, regulatory competence. APHIS claims that such an evaluation is
the province of EPA rather than USDA. The Geertson court noted that
although "one would expect that some federal agency is considering whether
there is some risk to engineering all of America's crops to include the gene that
confers resistance to glyphosate . . . ," it is not at all clear that any agency has
explored this question, or even considers the question to be within its
regulatory jurisdiction.' 3 '
2. International Center for Technology Assessment-The Strange Tale
of Creeping Bentgrass
Recently, significant effort has been devoted to genetically modifying
creeping bentgrass (Agrostis stolonifera) and Kentucky bluegrass (Poa
pratensis) to be resistant to glyphosate, the active ingredient in the herbicide
Roundup. Because these are the primary grasses used for lawns and golf
courses, such a modification might be extremely lucrative. The purveyor of
this GMO, the Scotts Company, received permission from USDA to conduct a
series of open air field tests in 2002 and 2003, and Scotts subsequently
submitted a petition requesting that USDA/APHIS deregulate glyphosate-
resistant creeping bentgrass.' 32 Environmental groups have raised significant
objections focused on the enhanced potential for these grasses to become
noxious weeds, and the fear that gene flow will spread glyphosate resistance to
creeping bentgrass' wild relatives. These environmental groups, in turn,
petitioned USDA/APHIS requesting that GM Kentucky bluegrass be placed on
the Federal Noxious Weed List.' 33 When APHIS denied this petition, the
128. Id. at *10.
129. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976).
130. See generally, Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624 (citing the Environmental
Assessment, Administrative Record at 5501).
131. Id. at *11.
132. Environmental Impact Statement: Petition for Deregulation of Genetically Engineered
Glyphosate-Tolerant Creeping Bentgrass, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,257 (Sept. 24, 2004).
133. A noxious week is "any plant or plant product that can directly or indirectly injure or
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International Center for Technology Assessment (ICTA) and the Center for
Food Safety sued in federal district court alleging first that USDA/APHIS
failed to adequately consider whether Roundup Ready creeping bentgrass is a
"plant pest," as defined under the Plant Protection Act, and second that the
agency violated NEPA by failing to properly assess the potential
environmental impacts associated with field trials of both GM grasses.' 34
Judge Henry Kennedy Jr. of the D.C. U.S. District Court found APHIS's denial
of the noxious weed petition to be based upon an arbitrary and capricious
interpretation of its statutory duties. 35  The court similarly concluded that
APHIS's failure to inquire whether field testing these GMOs might "affect
significantly the quality of the human environment"'136 had also been arbitrary
and capricious and inconsistent with the agency's own regulations.' 37  The
court thus permanently enjoined APHIS from processing any similar field test
request without first investigating whether the activity might significantly
affect the quality of the human environment.
Together, Geertson Seed Farm, Center for Food Safety, and ICTA
indicate that APHIS has systematically failed to fulfill its NEPA obligations
with regard to GM plants, and indicates a willingness on the part of federal
courts to intervene.
C. Failures of Regulatory Structure and Imagination.
A regulatory regime that is not enforceable is often worse than no
regulatory regime. Not only does the public go unprotected, but such a regime
engenders cynicism about the integrity and trustworthiness of government
institutions.38
Unfortunately, a litany of examples underscores the inability of the
regulatory agencies to enforce the unwieldy regulatory system they oversee
vis-A-vis agricultural biotechnology. StarLink com is perhaps the best known
example 139 of how the regulatory system can fail to keep unapproved GMOs
cause damage to crops .. or other interests of agriculture ... the natural resources of the United
States, the public health or the environment." 7 U.S.C. §7702(10) (2000). Listing has significant
consequences-listed noxious weeds are prohibited or restricted from entering the United States
and subject to restrictions on interstate movement. Id. §7712(f)(1) (2000).
134. International Center for Technology Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.
D.C. 2007) (hereafter ICTA).
135. Id. at 26.
136. 7 C.F.R. §372.5(d) (2007).
137. ICTA, supra note 134, at 29-30. See also Center for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F.
Supp.2d 1165, 1183-86 (D. Haw. 2005) (reaching an identical conclusion about similar filed test
permits).
138. See generally, Richard G. Peters, Vincent T. Cavello, and David B. McCallum, The
Determinants of Trust and Credibility in Environmental Risk Communication: An Empirical
Study, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 43 (1997) (identifying a strong relationship between perceptions of
government commitment to environmental regulation and perceptions of credibility and
honestly).
139. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance, supra note 63, at 593.
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out of the food system, but unfortunately there are many other such examples.
In the past few years, there have been well-publicized instances of unapproved
GMOs commingling with crops intended for human consumption. 4 ° Taken
together, these incidents undermine a cornerstone assumption of the United
States' regulatory strategy: voluntary self-policing can be a viable, long-term
strategy for managing this revolution in agriculture. Nothing shatters public
confidence in a regulatory system more than when an agency approves
products but does not conduct follow-up compliance and enforcement
activities.
The technology holds untold promise; however, that promise will never
be realized without a comprehensive and scientifically rigorous regulatory
system that ensures environmental and human health issues are adequately
addressed and in a way that is credible to the public. The United States does
not currently have such a regulatory system, to its detriment. Protecting the
public's interest in this context will require government to assume a far more
active role than the hands-off attitude that has been the hallmark of
conventional agricultural policy.
For example, one of the most innovative uses for biotechnology is in
biopharming-using plants (and animals) to produce industrial or
pharmaceutical compounds. 14 1  Biopharming might offer the potential to
provide patients with the benefits of greater and faster access to medicines.
Moreover, production of industrial and pharmaceutical compounds in plants
might significantly reduce facility and production costs, potentially making it
relatively easy to scale production to increased or varying demands. The
largest controversy surrounding biopharming involves the use of food crops for
producing non-food compounds. Proponents argue that food crops are a
natural choice for biopharming because of the extensive body of knowledge
that already exists about their biology, agronomic properties, and
cultivation. 42 Opponents counter that the risk of contaminating the food
140. See e.g., European Commission, Bt 10: Commission Requires Certification of U.S.
Exports to Stop Unauthorized GMO Entering the European Union, (reporting on the illegal
presence of Bt 10, an unapproved GM corn in shipments received in the EU) available at
http://gmo-crl.jrc.it/doc/BT10_EUROPA-PressRelease-certification.pdf; EPA Fines Syngenta
$1.5 Million for Distributing Unregistered Genetically Engineered Pesticide, http://yosemite.
epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e987e762f557727d852570bc0042cc90/2df47c5 1 f639be4e8525724b00
69655c!OpenDocument; Colin Macilwain, US Launches Probe into Sales of Unapproved
Transgenic Corn, NATURE (March 22, 2005) available at http://www.nature.com/news/
2005/050321/fuill/natureO3570.html; Contaminated Rice Flows to Global Market, (reporting on
the contamination of conventional rice destined in part for export markets with Bayer's
unapproved Liberty Link 601 Rice) available at http://www.zawya.com/story.
cfm/sidZAWYA20070218031349/SecMain/pagHomepage; John Henry, Tainted Rice Testing
Farmers Trust, 23 ARKANSAS BUSINESS 1 (Dec.4, 2006); Europe Warns on Rice from US,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE (Sept. 22, 2006).
141. See supra note 100 (discussing the term "biopharming").
142. See, e.g., BIO, Plant Made Pharmaceuticals: Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/pmp/factsheet2.asp; see also Bindu Dey, Are We Ready for PMPs?
(May 12, 2004) available at http://www.pharmabiz.com/article/detnews.asp?articleid=21817&
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supply is so high that food crops ought never be used for biopharming. 143
Although few biopharmed compounds are currently on the market, 144
there are many such crops in various stages of clinical or field trials. Since
2001, biopharm experimental test permits have been issued in 14 states.145
Unfortunately, the same culture of carelessness has carried over into
experimental biopharming, which is the biotechnology- mediated production of
industrial 146 and pharmaceutical 14 7 compounds in plants. Biopharm crops have
been tested in fields across the country under the same laissez-faire standards
used for first-generation GM crops 48-with minimal and poorly enforced
safety precautions based on physical containment. 149
Not only have regulators not taken the threats posed by this technology
seriously, neither have growers. In the last decade, biotech companies and
research universities have violated even those minimal safety precautions more
than a hundred times.1 50  Because many of these open-air field tests of
experimental biopharm crops take place in the combelt, these violations put the
sectionid=46&z=y (asserting that "the obvious choice of plants for PMPs is the GM food
crops.").
143. See generally, Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 64; see also USDA
Advisory Committee, supra note 102, at 9.
144. Prodigene markets tryptophan produced through biopharming, and in January 2006,
USDA's Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB) gave regulatory approval for the first plant-made
vaccine to Dow AgroSciences' Animal Health division and their Concert TM product, a vaccine to
improve animal health.
145. Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska,
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
146. For example, APHIS just completed an Environmental Assessment of transgenic
safflower genetically modified to produce a carp protein. APHIS, Availability of an
Environmental Assessment for a Proposed Field Release of Genetically Engineered Safflower, 72
Fed. Reg. 5263 (February 5, 2007). The theory behind this genetic modification is to produce a
crop that can be used as a food source for aquaculture, thus alleviating some of the pressure that
demand for fish meal in aquaculture places on fisheries.
147. The European Commission recently approved its first biopharmed product
manufactured with ingredients derived from biotech goats. Http://www.emea.europa.eu/
humandocsiPDFs/EPAR/atryn/H-587-PI-en.pdf. The drug's ingredients include proteins from the
milk of biotech goats. The pharmaceutical treats the rare blood-clotting disorder antithrombin
deficiency. The product is expected to enter the marketplace this year. See, Q & A: GTC's
Geoffrey Cox, available at http://www.redherring.com/Home/15291 (estimating that the product
will reach the European Market at the end of 2007 and the US market in 2008.).
148. For an in-depth exploration of some of these requirements, see Bratspies, The Illusion
of Care, supra note 63; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience Inconsistencies, and
Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. &
MARY L. Rev. 2167 (2004).
149. See e.g., Center for Food Safety v. Johanns, 451 F.Supp.2d. 1165 (D. Haw. 2006); see
also Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 64.
150. APHIS, Compliance and Enforcement, available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/
brs/compliance.html. Unfortunately APHIS considers this to be a low number of violations, and
therefore a success story. Others are far less sanguine about the conclusions to be drawn from
this number. See, e.g., Academia/Industry Violated USDA Rules, available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/buzz/display.php3?StorylD= 114.
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food supply at a high risk for contamination.' 5' As biotech crops expand, and
as more biopharming crops are developed, these failures must be confronted.
The USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century
Agriculture articulated serious concerns around this topic. One portion of the
Committee argued that "the federal government should not approve the use of
food crops for the production of medical and industrial substances, even if the
substances are deemed safe, because no regulatory process or containment
system can assure that these products will never enter the food supply."' 152
Other committee members believed that a tiered risk approach could ensure the
safety and integrity of the food and feed supply adequately. 153  For both
groups, it is clear that the Federal government's capacity to address the issues
of containment and to generate public confidence in that containment system
remained a critical issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States' approach to regulating GMOs can be described
charitably as a creative attempt to regulate an emerging technology with
existing laws. However, the regulatory pastiche that evolved from this attempt
enlists a patchwork of agencies, statutes and regulations pressed into service
from vastly different contexts, and originally intended to further different
goals. As a result, too many of the central questions for agricultural
biotechnology fall into the grey zones between statutory regimes-where
agencies act with dubious legal authority. The system lacks transparency and
does not permit the kinds of public participation necessary to generate public
confidence in the regulatory process.
The time is ripe to improve the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.
New legislation is needed to protect humans and the environment. With new
legal authority and better regulations, a strong-but not stifling-system can
be established that independently reviews and approves products that are safe
for consumers and the environment. Such a system is essential if consumers
are to have confidence in biotechnology, and we are to meet the challenges that
transgenic animals and biopharming will pose to human and environmental
safety.
151. Indeed, in 2002, the Office of Science and Technology Policy acknowledged the
significance of this risk. See Proposed Federal Actions To Update Field Test Requirements for
Biotechnology Derived Plants and To Establish Early Food Safety Assessments for New Proteins
Produced by Such Plants, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,587 (Aug. 2, 2002) ("As the number and diversity of
field tests increase, the likelihood that cross-pollination due to pollen drift from field tests to
commercial fields and commingling of seeds produced under field tests with commercial seeds or
grain may also increase. This could result in intermittent, low-levels of biotechnology-derived
genes, and gene products occurring in commerce that have not gone through all applicable
regulatory reviews.").
152. USDA Advisory Committee, supra note 102, at 9.
153. Id.
